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Smart  grids  are  a  key  feature  of  future  energy  scenarios,  with  the overarching  goal  of better  aligning
energy  generation  and  demand.  The  work  presented  here  considers  the role  of the  user in such  systems,
and  the  contexts  in which  such roles  might  emerge.  The  data  used  is  drawn  from  focus  groups  with
72  participants,  using  novel  scenario  techniques  to  contextualise  smart  grid  technologies  in domestic
settings.  Two  contrasting  visions  of the  smart  grid  are  presented,  a centralised  system  based  on current
institutional  arrangements,  and  an  alternative  system  in which  decentralisation  of  generation  and  controlSM
omestic
nergy citizenship
mart grid
is  pursued.  Using  the  concepts  of  ‘energy  consumer’  and  ‘energy  citizen’,  the paper  considers  what  forms
of  engagement  are  likely  to be generated  by  the two  visions.  We  propose  that  smart  grid designs  must
look  beyond  simply  the  technology  and  recognise  that  a smart  user  who  is  actively  engaged  with  energy
is  critical  to much  of what  is proposed  by demand  side  management.  We  conclude  that  the energy  citizen
holds  out most  promise  in  this  regard.  The  implications  of  this  for  policy  makers  are  discussed.
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. Introduction
Energy systems are undergoing enormous transformations
round the world. Though loosely deﬁned, the concept of the ‘smart
rid’ entails power networks transmitting digital information as
ell as energy. The primary purpose is to allow (near) real time con-
umption and generation data to be transmitted between different
odes, but it also allows for possibilities such as remote activation
f appliances. In combination with facilitating increased amounts
f distributed generation, often from renewable sources with vari-
ble output, the goal is to optimise the balance of generation and
onsumption in order to achieve efﬁciencies [1].
More than just a grand technological project however, a smart
rid has the potential to fundamentally change the social dynam-
cs of the energy system. Two opposing visions of how the smart
rid’s potential might be realised are established [2], though they
hould be considered two poles of a continuum rather than a
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inary choice. The ﬁrst, in keeping with the centralised, hierarchical
aradigm which has deﬁned the energy systems of the last cen-
ury [3], entails centralised generators increasing monitoring and
ontrol of end-user consumption [4], as detailed in UKERC’s ‘Smart
ower Sector’  scenario of smart grid futures [5]. Henceforth, we refer
o this vision as ‘centralised demand side management’ (CDSM),
s a speciﬁc form of the generic term ‘demand side management’
DSM). The alternative involves blurring the distinction between
enerators and end-users, with the latter—whether as individuals
r communities—increasingly independent through microgenera-
ion and self-management, a model Wolsink calls ‘DisGenMiGrids’
distributed generation micro grids) [2], and similar to UKERC’s
Groundswell’ scenario [5]. These contrasting visions share the same
echnologies, but differ radically in the social structures underpin-
ing them.
In extending generator control of consumption, centralised
emand side management targets the provision of accurate usage
nformation to consumers, including dynamic pricing tariffs, and
he remote control of electricity load and devices. Within these
pproaches there is considerable latitude in regard to the role
nvisaged for the user; however all require integration into daily
outines and so some degree of user interaction. A ‘weak’ version
f CDSM might simply entail a ‘smart’ implementation of dynamic
ricing tariffs, in which certain white goods are remotely trig-
ered to run during low demand periods. A ‘strong’ implementation
ould include using real-time pricing signals and new technologies
der the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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o encourage and enable users to ‘time shift’1 energy-intensive
ehaviours away from periods of peak demand, or towards periods
hen ﬂuctuating renewable energy generation is high. Such an
pproach would require energy to take a prominent role in the
rdering of household activities (see [6] for a more detailed
ppraisal of what this range of options might look like).
To date, a considerable body of work has been generated from
ractice theory-based studies of energy use in domestic contexts,
e.g. [7,8]). Some of this work has called for a disassembling of
he producer–consumer divide which has deﬁned the energy sys-
ems of the last century, to be replaced instead by the kind of
co-management’ of resources [9] seen in DisGenMiGrids. Strengers
xtends this further, calling for ‘co-management of practices’ [10],
 more ambitious vision which recognises the co-production of
emand—that is the relationships in which wants and needs are
ormed—as well as supply. By contrast, much of the work to date
n DSM speciﬁcally has been narrow in focus and concerned with
ndividual users, disregarding the dynamics of the shared house-
old as a deployment site [11,12]. Research that has explored this
rea is often limited to certain aspects of DSM, for example on smart
etres (e.g. [13]), in home displays (IHDs) [14,15]; dynamic pricing
16]; or peer comparison feedback effects [17].
Researching the societal implications of smart grids faces similar
roblems to that of other new technologies (e.g. biotechnologies,
anotechnologies) in gaining insight into socio-technical systems
hat do not yet exist. The uncertainty of future technologies neces-
itates deﬁning them for research participants. In doing so the
ontext and framing used can have a large inﬂuence on responses.
espite this, the necessity of such research stems from the con-
iderable beneﬁt in upstream engagement with new technologies
here lay perspectives help to direct research and development
fforts [18], and smart grids are no exception in this regard [6].
The current research makes use of contravision scenario ﬁlms
19] within a series of focus groups in order to engage members
f the public with the range of potential smart grid technolo-
ies available within future energy systems. These enable us to
robe people’s understandings of, and engagement with, their
wn energy consumption, and explore interactions with current
nd future smart grid technologies. Recent work draws attention
o the prominent role that the user is expected to play within
mart grid systems [20]. Our core interest is what that role might
ook like, and the consequences of it. Two forms of public are
dentiﬁed—energy consumers and energy citizens—which in crude
erms are distinguished by their orientation: as energy end-users
nd energy system participants respectively. It is argued that the
nergy consumer frame is a consequence of the same paradigm that
rives CDSM, and yet it undermines the very thing CDSM hopes
o achieve—namely a grid in which consumption adjusts to meet
eneration. We  propose that energy citizens, aligning with Dis-
enMiGrids, hold out much greater potential in this regard. The
mplications of this for policy makers are discussed.
. Methods
.1. Theoretical framingExploring the role of end-users within smart grids requires
n understanding of the context in which energy and associated
evices are used within the home. In this section we will outline our
1 Time shifting involves the moving of energy-consuming practices away from
imes of peak electricity demand, in order to ease the demands placed on electricity
eneration.
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mplementation of practice theory, and explain the energy citizen
nd energy consumer concepts which structure our analysis.
Practice Theory is employed here as a means of unpacking the
undane, embedded use of energy in day-to-day life. Practice
heory has a number of overlapping formulations [21,22], but as
pplied here it breaks down practices into four components: mate-
ials and infrastructures; rules and knowledge; embodied skills;
nd engagements and meanings [8].
Time-shifting showering for example, entails material techno-
ogical changes to feed signals (e.g. electricity unit costs) to the user
hrough the smart grid and associated display device, and incorpo-
ating new knowledge of how the system works. It also potentially
ntails changes in skills—for example the user altering their show-
ring routine to complete it in ﬁve minutes instead of eight—and
lso possibly in meanings—as in the shower’s symbolic purpose
witching from a refreshing wake-up before work, to a relaxing de-
tress after work. Changing the practice of showering is comprised
hen of multiple elements unique to it. Additionally, and impor-
antly, showering practices as with most domestic practices, are
ften developed in a dynamic way through interactions both with
ther members of a household and wider society, through inter-
ction and negotiation. These include powerful norms conferring
roper behaviour, for example signifying not only suitable hygiene,
ut also achieving this with a rapidity appropriate for the contem-
orary time-poor adult (showers being faster than the baths they
upplanted) [7, Ch. 5].
We  use this perspective on energy use—embedded in the social
nd physical infrastructure of daily domestic life—to structure our
nalysis. The manner in which it is deployed might be characterised
s ‘weak’ practice theory [23, p. 1279] as we  do not adopt prac-
ices as our unit of enquiry. Instead, our overarching frame is that
f energy consumer and energy citizen. This preference for main-
aining the human actor as our focus stems from a desire to avoid
educing the individual to a mule-like ‘carrier’ of practices. Our
ybrid approach is an attempt to recognise that energy use emerges
rom complex socio-technical landscapes, whilst still maintaining
he agency of the human actor.
.1.1. Energy consumer and energy citizen personas
The speciﬁcs of these twinned concepts will be given in Section
, here though we  wish to provide a background to their formation.
he concepts emerged during data analysis, out of the necessity to
econcile the tensions inherent within individuals’ accounts. One
uch tension was between a wish for energy to remain invisible
nd a demand for more knowledge about energy consumption and
fﬁcient usage.
These concepts exist as both personas and frames, which is to
ay they are both enacted from within and imposed from with-
ut, in a manner that is co-constructive. We  deploy these personas
s characters—roles that are performed, or in the case of frames
xpected to be performed, with a particular set of assumptions
bout their orientation to overarching social structures (in this case,
he ‘energy system’ in its broadest sense). In this they differ some-
hat from the typology of energy system users deployed by van
liet [24], which is “deﬁned by the kind of relationship between
roviders and consumers” [p. 3]. Van Vliet identiﬁes three types:
i) customer; (ii) citizen–consumer; and (iii) co-provider. The latter
wo overlap with energy citizen as used here, however our for-
ulation is less concerned with formal relations between actors,
avouring instead the actor’s orientation to the energy system—that
s to say their knowledge, and meanings of the system and their role
ithin it—reﬂecting this paper’s interest in how to enrol smart grid
articipants most effectively.
Energy consumer and energy citizen personas should not be
ead as mutually exclusive. Many participants adopted one persona
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ore comfortably than the other, but nevertheless deployed both
t different times and in different contexts. It is in the shifting,
verlapping boundaries of the personas that tensions emerge.
.2. Participants
The data is drawn from four focus groups, each of eighteen
eople, conducted in and around the city of Nottingham. The inten-
ion was to achieve a broadly representative demographic spread,
hilst ensuring a high proportion had some existing experience of
ow carbon energy schemes, which contain elements of smart grids
e.g. distributed generation). The result was a wide range of par-
icipants with varying levels of knowledge and engagement with
nergy efﬁciency and reduction schemes.
An agency recruited participants based on demographic rep-
esentativeness (age, gender, ethnicity, and income) of the
ecruitment areas (see Appendix). The ﬁrst focus group was
ecruited to offer a spread of the urban city (C) population and had
 modal income range of between £25,000 and £50,000. Subse-
uent groups were selected to offer different experiences of low
arbon energy schemes and varying levels of urbanicity and socio-
conomic status. Bickton (B) is a rural village some twenty miles
rom the city with a modal income of <£25,000, where a wind
urbine scheme was refused planning permission two  years ago
ollowing local resistance. Lowell (L) is similarly rural but has a
igher modal income of >£75,000, and has a wind turbine scheme
un by a consortium of villagers, as well as several zero carbon
ousing developments. Weston (W)  is an inner city estate with a
odal income of <£25,000, which for the last decade has had its
wn community energy group, which among other activities runs
 scheme installing PV on homes at no cost, in exchange for which
t collects the Feed-In Tariff which is invested back into schemes to
educe the energy use of the community. In what follows, ‘C’, ‘B’, ‘L’
r ‘W’  designates which focus group a quote was drawn from.
.3. Procedure and materials
Three short ﬁlms2 made by the research team were shown,
nterspersed with discussions structured around themes and tech-
ologies featured in the preceding ﬁlm. Each focus group was
ub-divided into three groups of six to facilitate in-depth dis-
ussion, with a researcher allocated to each. Discussion themes
omprised existing energy practices; time-shifting and ‘smart’
nergy technologies; understanding of energy and billing; and per-
eptions of the energy industry.
The ﬁlms were intended to anchor abstract technologies in a
omestic setting that might be meaningful to participants. Char-
cters illustrated in the ﬁlms were purposefully chosen in order to
epresent a broad spectrum of society and each showed a subset
f smart grid technologies being used in a ﬁctional home. The sett-
ngs and range of smart grid technologies were developed through
 multidisciplinary workshop (N = 12) incorporating experts within
ngineering, computer science, psychology and sociology with
nterests in energy technologies.
In an effort to avoid the narrative framings from biasing subse-
uent discussion, a ‘contravision’ approach [19] was used in which
ach ﬁlm was split into ‘light’ and ‘dark’ versions of the same narra-
ive. In one the technology and users operated in perfect harmony,
n the other the discord was total. These intentionally extreme
ccounts were intended to open up as wide an imaginative space
2 Short ﬁlms used during focus group hosted at http://horizonenergy.
logspot.co.uk/.
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s possible in order to facilitate discussion, whilst simultaneously
ngaging participants with a recognisable setting.
. Results
Transcriptions of the focus groups were analysed using a the-
atic approach, coded using Nvivo software. Our following analysis
rst discusses the question of how users are framed, and how this
aps to the sociality of the shared home. We then introduce the
oncepts of energy consumer and energy citizen, with which we
tructure our subsequent analysis of user roles within smart grid
ystems. In particular we  consider the idea of the energy consumer
ithin CDSM approaches, and outline the challenges this creates.
e then focus on developing the idea of the energy citizen, the
ntertwined roles of community and ownership in relation to this
ersona and what this means for smart grids.
.1. Understanding the User
Contemporary policy makers commonly approach energy
emand issues with an individualistic model of attitudes and choice
23]. Accordingly, incentives for shifts in energy behaviour are
ommonly framed in ﬁnancial (lower bills) terms [11]. Our focus
roup participants were immediately responsive to such a framing,
eﬂecting that the paradigm’s inﬂuence is not limited to govern-
ent. When presented with such a frame, participants afﬁrmed
nancial reasons as the dominant incentive to adopt such tech-
ologies. Discussions quickly problematised such a simple framing
owever:
L[owell]: I think unless your savings are dramatic. . . for the
upheaval, the change of lifestyle for pennies then you’ve.  . .
would children sit there? [. . .]  If you’ve got small children, what
would I say? ‘This is going to save you ﬁve pence, you can’t have
your dinner just yet’, but they start crying.  . .
The role of the child here demonstrates that motivations are far
ore diverse and complex than that captured by an individualistic
raming of sustainable behaviour changes. There are multiple phys-
cal and psychological rewards triggered by energy-using practices
hich might, in any given situation, outweigh speciﬁc concerns
e.g. ﬁnancial) that CDSM promotions might appeal to.
A situated appraisal of the user has been largely overlooked by
revious research into the acceptance of smart grid technologies (a
are exception being Strengers’ work [16,25] on dynamic pricing).
ocus on individual users of such technologies neglects the complex
ocial topography of shared households in which no one actor holds
otal control over energy practices and associated consumption.
ettie [26] identiﬁes “practice domain owners” within households,
ho take ownership of a subset of the household’s practices, and
hus determine associated energy use. The picture from the focus
roups suggested even greater intricacy. The quote above from a
ather pressed to schedule cooking at a time deemed acceptable by
is children points to the fact that even domain owners are denied
he liberty of a monopoly.
Paying for energy is one of the few instances when energy
ecomes surfaced in conscious decision-making. As such the bill
ayer could be expected to play an important role as an agent
f change when implementing smart grid technologies. However,
ven here inﬂuence remains mediated by the complex, often gen-
ered [27], distribution of practices amongst household members.
ad may  pay the bill but if mum  does the washing then who
ecides whether time shifting is implemented? For projects seek-
ng to recruit smart grid participants, this should act as a warning
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gainst reducing the household to the attitudinal responses of a
ingle autonomous rational actor.
.2. Energy consumers
Participants’ responses during the focus group discussions took
wo contradictory forms, in accordance with what can be charac-
erised as their orientation to energy. This engagement commonly
eveloped as the discussion did, as participants moved from an
mmediate, unsituated perspective, in which energy-related prac-
ices were rather inﬂexible, and energy itself was of minimal
resence, to a more reﬂexive, grounded one in which energy
ecame salient and consequential. These conceptions were marked
nough to suggest two different personas were being deployed
y participants, which we label energy consumer and energy cit-
zen respectively. For this we draw on Devine-Wright’s concept
f ‘energy citizenship’ [28] in which the public’s role in energy is
framed by notions of equitable rights and responsibilities across soci-
ty for dealing with the consequences of energy consumption” (p. 71).
n contrast with the consumer, for whom energy is simply a good to
e expended in pursuit of personal goals, the energy citizen engages
ith energy as a meaningful part of their practices.
The most immediately accessible persona for many was  that of
nergy consumer. Here, discussions emphasised energy as just one
f multiple contingences of daily life, e.g. work; family; ﬁnances;
any of which are more pressing. Commonly, energy’s desired
ole is to be neither seen nor heard, as in the ﬁrst quote below.
he second quote emphasises the subservient role of energy in
he mundane activities of the household. The notion that it should
tructure them was alien to most participants’ current understand-
ngs. Unlike the practices it makes possible, it is not “part of your
ife” and participants did not have, nor want to make, time to think
bout energy.
C[ity] 1: Do people realistically have that much time in the day to
think about their energy situations, ‘cause to me,  we’re looking
for easy solutions, that don’t take any time to think about.
C2: It’s a necessity in the morning, having a shower, it’s part of
your life. I don’t want to be thinking, oh, I can’t have another two
minutes in the shower because, heaven forbid, the meter’s going
to go over. I think it’s one of those things that can potentially
stress you out even more.
In accordance with these views, the notion, as advanced in the
light’ ﬁlms and implicit in some accounts of future potential func-
ions of smart grids, e.g. [4,11], that energy might be a ‘surfaced’
spect of interaction within the household—that is a consciously
erceived entity and an explicit topic of conversation and group
lanning—was met  with considerable scepticism.
Reﬂecting energy’s current background role, participants
xpressed a lack of knowledge about functional matters such as
ow pricing worked, and what the energy demand of different
oods was. This coalesced around the issue of energy bills, a com-
on  complaint being their opaqueness. A clear tension existed here
etween the desire to not think about energy on the one hand, and
n the other a concern that a lack of knowledge was  costing money,
ither through inefﬁcient use of energy or unsuitable tarifﬁng. This
as exacerbated by high levels of industry distrust.
.3. The role of IHDsMany participants appeared to read IHDs as a solution to this
ension, by offering an undemanding means of becoming informed.
owever, some that had existing displays complained that the dis-
lays themselves were opaque in their presentation of information
d
t
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m Social Science 2 (2014) 21–29
nd relied on poorly understood metrics like kilowatt hours. Given
he preference amongst many for energy to remain backgrounded,
t is unsurprising that several participants expressed interest in
HDs that presented information in very simple terms, e.g. with a
ight indicating current electricity price through colour. This appeal
peaks of a desire to understand and manage energy use through
ntuitive and undemanding means, summed up by one participant
s “A quick glance, if you’ve got the time” [C].
However, even positive accounts from IHD owners indicated
hat used in isolation the surfacing of energy by IHDs tended to
iminish after a matter of days or weeks, and become largely hid-
en beneath the patina of daily experience, leaving limited or no
ong term effect on practices.
It is clear from our work and that of others [29,30] that the
tility of IHDs is limited if they are used in isolation purely for
eeding back consumption data. Participants’ accounts suggest that
uch approaches fail due to purely targeting a single element
f practices—knowledge—in an abstract (e.g. poorly understood
kw/h’) form that fails to engage with actors’ meanings. It also
ails to address embodied actions in any clear way, which is to
ay, what is a user to do with this information? In contrast, focus
roup participants who  used an IHD as but one element of a
ider microgeneration scheme appeared to have a greater ongo-
ng engagement, and studies of dynamic pricing schemes suggest
hat, as one element of such a scheme, a display can help achieve
ustained reductions in energy use [31]. Participants in IHD tri-
ls have highlighted a desire for accompanying advice on energy
aving [32]. In isolation however, their utility appears limited.
IHDs are a technology common to CDSM and DisGenMiGrid
odels, providing household consumption information in both.
eyond this their roles differ somewhat. For the former, they offer
 means for the generator to manage demand by relaying pricing
nformation to the user. In the latter, their primary role is in provid-
ng the user with data on their personal or community generation.
s such, both integrate IHDs into a set of practices, in a manner sup-
ortive of ongoing engagement. The exception is weak versions of
DSM, which favour automation over user involvement. In such a
ystem, IHDs are likely to quickly become an irrelevance, as they
re currently for many focus group participants.
.4. Automation and time shifting
IHDs are one element of the project of making the smart grid
nd-user supply-responsive. One key aspect of this may  be to
ncourage people to time shift activities—for example shower-
ng at a different point in the day—by relaying signals to them
rom a network controller. Alternatively, the users’ devices may  be
nrolled through automation—for example starting a pre-loaded
hite goods machine at a time of low demand. In the case of CDSM
uch interventions would rely on economic motivations. Difﬁcul-
ies for this approach emerged from the focus groups.
When evaluating concrete examples that might entail reorder-
ng practices, most participants were quick to adopt an energy
onsumer persona, a perspective from which other demands were
een as taking priority over the need to reduce or shift energy.
ccordingly, changes that were easily accepted were those that did
ot require reconﬁguring the practice in question.
Automating white goods was viewed favourably as long as these
ould ﬁt within existing routines. One participant, for example, was
appy for her washing machine to run overnight as long as she
ould delay its start long enough for her to fall asleep and so not be
isturbed by it. Participants were highly positive about automation
hat ran their white goods whilst their solar panels were generat-
ng electricity—an example of the beneﬁcial knock-on effects of
icrogeneration. Key to the popularity of these deployments of
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consume and to reduce their environmental impact there is con-
siderable danger that recipients of these conﬂicting messages areM. Goulden et al. / Energy Resea
utomation is that energy consumption is not point-of-use during
ractices involving white goods, which is to say the user’s involve-
ent in loading and unloading of the machine can be separated
rom the running of it. As long as the programme completes within a
indow acceptable to the user it entails little or no reconﬁguration
f the user’s role within the practice.
Exceptions to this generally stemmed from local circumstances,
uch as concern from those in terraced housing that the machine
ight generate too much noise for themselves or neighbours to run
vernight. Such examples point to the danger that those with the
east ﬂexibility to shift their practices might be those with the great-
st economic need to beneﬁt. Whilst the un- or under-employed
ho are at home during (part of) the day have in theory the greatest
exibility with regard to conducting energy-using practices [33],
he most vulnerable may  have chaotic lifestyles or constrained abil-
ties that negate any such opportunities. Deployments of domestic
mart grid technologies require further research in this regard.
For energy consumption that is point-of-use, e.g. showering and
ooking, reactions to time shifting were far less favourable. Partic-
pants would commonly point to the nexus of related actors and
ctions that made moving such practices impossible. This might
e the demands of children to be fed, or the need to be showered
efore leaving for work at 8.00a.m. Suggestions of shifting such
ractices often generated emotive responses reﬂecting the degree
o which they are woven into the repertoires of performance from
hich individuals construct notions of self [7]:
B[ickton]1: I get up in the morning, I might get up earlier than
most people but the ﬁrst thing I do is take a shower.
B2: Yes.
B1: I don’t want Big Brother dictating to me  the time I get up.
B3: No, no, that’s how you start your day, it wakes me  up and
gets you going.
For these participants showering signiﬁed a process of gaining
lertness at the start of the day. Two other meanings attached to
howering were that of comfort and relaxation. Indeed participants
eacted negatively to a device, portrayed in one of our ﬁlms, which
imited the amount of time that could be spent in the shower before
he water turned cold. Both relaxation and comfort were threat-
ned by this form of intervention. In a similar manner, there was
ore openness to the notion of using electric vehicles as a personal
tore and source for surplus microgenerated energy as opposed to
 grid store and source for surplus energy, regardless of whether
he user maintained an override. In this example it seems that the
ndependence commonly signiﬁed by cars [34] was  challenged by
he technology, but less so if the participant maintained ownership
f operations (even if only symbolically).
.5. The implications of the energy consumer for CDSM
It is striking that the discourses upon which the energy con-
umer frequently draws are ones that render consumer-targeted
nterventions largely moot. When rejecting speciﬁc examples of
DSM, participants referenced obligations to other family mem-
ers; or the requirements of their work life; or the everyday
ressures that lead them to seek out convenience. They did not
eference ﬁnancial matters. As such, participants’ accounts suggest
hat the only forms of behaviour change that might be achieved
y targeting energy consumers are those that enable convenience,
r at least are convenience-neutral (such as time-windowed white
oods automation); or that are incentivised by ﬁnancial induce-
ents that are so signiﬁcant they compel the consumer to consider
hem. Given the low cost of most practices when considered in
l
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solation,3 ﬁnding an economic basis for such an approach could
e extremely challenging.
The demonstrated efﬁcacy of dynamic pricing trials [31] could
e seen to contradict this argument. Considerable variability of
mpact is apparent from such trials (ﬁgure in [31]), reﬂecting the
nteractions of speciﬁc trial designs with the context in which they
re enacted. They nevertheless appear to be consistently success-
ul of achieving (often signiﬁcant) reductions in use. One could read
heir success as evidence that energy consumers were responsive
o pricing signals, such that they would accept—at least for certain
eriods of peak demand—an extended surfacing of energy in which
undane practices might need to be reordered on a daily or hourly
asis. However, we  would argue that the fact that dynamic pri-
ing schemes have been successful is likely to be an outcome of the
elf-selection of participants. We  can hypothesise that those taking
art are likely to be predominantly energy citizens who  are already
ngaged with energy as a surfaced component of their practices.
his is supported by Strengers’ work, which found that those that
ook part in an Australian trial commonly cited “a sense of social
esponsibility” [16] rather than any individualistic motivations for
heir participation. Energy consumers may  be unlikely to volun-
eer for such a trial in the ﬁrst place given the changing orientation
o energy it would require, and indeed reluctance to participate in
uch schemes has been noted previously [35]. Further support for
his hypothesis comes from a study of a large trial in which par-
icipation was  non-voluntary. This found that average use actually
ncreased under the scheme [36].
This is not the only sense in which the energy consumer is prob-
ematic for CDSM. In Section 3.2 above, we  noted that the energy
onsumer persona seemingly frees users from engagement with
nergy, whilst burdening them with a concern that they are not
eing efﬁcient or getting the best deal. Further contradictions or
ensions were apparent when participants appraised some of the
echnologies, skills and meanings embedded in their everyday con-
umer lifestyles. This is illustrated in an exchange discussing the
ole of younger generations in tackling climate change:
W1:  It’s easier to educate children than it is to educate old
codgers like us.  . ..  We  try and do our bit but those kids are going
to do more than us.
W2:  It’s those same kids you’re talking about, they think nothing
of jumping on a ﬂight and going around the world once or twice
a year. So they learn how to turn a light off and then they go and
jump on a plane and go and spend a month in Thailand.
We observed this phenomenon in several forms of response.
any participants could see a contradiction in the motives of
nergy companies in encouraging energy efﬁciency who, by the
ature of their business, were seen to make money when individ-
als consume more, not less. At a household level, one participant
ecounted her successful efforts to convince her children to recycle.
owever, when it came to their energy consumption, which took
he form of constant charging of “the gadgets, their personal posses-
ions” [W], she held up her hands in surrender. Her children were
onsumers and this was  healthy consumption. As such it was  not
omething she had the right to challenge.
These responses highlight participants’ awareness of the con-
radictions inherent in targeting sustainable behaviour through
 consumer model. In encouraging individuals to simultaneouslyiable to respond with cynicism and disengagement [37, p. 115, 38].
3 At the standard UK rate of 13 pence/kW h, making a cup of tea costs less than a
enny in electricity.
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late to ownership of the home. Discussions of energy use being
monitored; cheaper tariffs requiring time shifting; or the purchase
of speciﬁc remote-operated ‘smart’ appliances,4 prompted fears of6 M.  Goulden et al. / Energy Resea
ombined with a distrust of the energy industry [39], it creates a
otentially unfavourable environment for introducing CDSM.
.6. Energy citizens
The shallow and inﬂexible engagement with energy began to
iminish as the focus groups proceeded. Participants began to
ecount examples that showed their practices to be more plastic:
earning to switch appliances off at the wall after ﬁnding out how
uch they used in standby; turning off lights in empty rooms at the
nsistence of the grandchildren (another example of the pluralistic
etting). The energy citizen persona became increasingly apparent,
eading some to self-critique their practices, even whilst defending
hem. This again suggests internal tensions between citizen and
onsumer personas:
C: All of our negative reasons are quite luxury reasons really,
aren’t they? They don’t hold any water, when you are talking
about extremely high energy costs and climate change. There’s
going to become a point where, like our lifestyles will change
so much that some of the things, some of our arguments won’t
be that good, but right now, they are, you know what I mean,
it’s a big change for us, so right now, it’s like, no, can’t do that.
We noted above that not all participants started from the same
osition relative to the two personas. Highly notable was the dif-
erent levels of engagement with energy between groups who had
irect experience of community or personal energy systems and
hose who did not. Those with direct experience had a heightened
wareness of energy’s roles within their practices. This appeared
o foster a greater openness to the smart grid schemes discussed
n the focus groups. They were quick not only to engage as energy
itizens on a theoretical level, but also at a practical level of lived
xperiences.
Practice theory suggests that a change in one element of a
ractice—for example an unresponsive device, or new knowledge
leaned from a friend—can lead to a reconﬁguration of the entire
ssemblage [21]. Pierce and Paulos’ [40] phenomenological account
f human-electricity relations provides further insight into this
rocess. Drawing on Ihde’s [41] schematic of human-technology
elations, Pierce and Paulos describe rare occurrences of “alterity
elations to electricity” (p. 2407), when energy becomes presenced
s an object in its own right. This is markedly different from the
background relation” energy commons occupies, in which it struc-
ures experience (e.g. by lighting a room) without being consciously
oted. An example of alterity is the running ﬂat of a battery, at
hich point energy becomes realised in its absence. Our research
howed that community energy schemes have a similar effect
hrough making energy salient; in particular microgeneration tech-
ologies draw attention through the creation of electricity.
For those producing energy through microgeneration, as well
s consuming it, the effect of this surfacing is a reorientation
owards energy as an active component in their practices, rather
han something taken-for-granted. In contrast to the negative sur-
acing invoked by paying energy bills this is in a positive frame,
hich focuses on the gains to the individual (see [42]). This engage-
ent potentially eases transitions to lower carbon lifestyles, as
uggested by the following excerpt.
L: we have a four kilowatt [PV] system and what I ﬁnd very
interesting is it’s not what it generates, it is how it changes our
behaviour because we’ve suddenly become much, much more
aware of what we’re doing and what we’re spending, there’s the
meter that they gave us which shows how much we’ve been
generating but there’s another meter which shows how much a Social Science 2 (2014) 21–29
we’re using. My  eye is now on the meter of which we’re using
and that’s really changed my  behaviour.
It is important to emphasise that this shift to an alterity relation
o energy goes beyond mere visibility, as the surfacing metaphor
ight suggest. The surfacing offered by displays acting in isolation
an be characterised as hermeneutic [40, p. 2407], that is reading
nergy through the device. The device is a mediator: the user pri-
arily experiencing it rather than the energy being represented.
y contrast, the alterity surfacing offered by microgeneration is
arked out by the greater “ratio of objectness” [41, p. 108] accorded
o energy. It does this by involving the user in its creation as well
s consumption. This creates potentials for more intuitive engage-
ents:
C [PV owner]: I think it would be interesting to use the smart
meter thing, but I suspect it would just be interesting, whether
we change the way  we operate as a result of the information,
I’m not sure. We’ve kind of come to the conclusion that now you
use all your big machines when the sun’s shining.
Here devices are recognised as dependant on the energy ﬂow-
ng from the sun and captured by the PV panels. It was  clear from
articipants’ accounts that microgeneration technology was trigg-
ring different meanings relating to energy, most notably personal
wnership, a close correlate of citizenship. In turn, this was prom-
ting the development of new knowledge and skills (e.g. checking
he weather forecast and setting the washing machine to run when
he sun was  out).
This linking of energy and speciﬁc practices is a more powerful
atalyst of change than one which conceives of users as individual
conomic actors and accordingly targets them with information
uch as price signals [16, p. 7320]. We  highlight the importance
f recognising the interpersonal and embedded nature of energy
ractices. The ownership of production gives energy an overt role
n users’ formulations of their practices, with implications for
ow they both use and think about it. The following quote hints
t the potentially complex ways in which behaviour and values
re co-constructive [43]. For this participant, the presenced role
f microgenerated energy in behaviour inﬂuenced energy-related
alues, in turn feeding back into behaviour:
L: I think both on the supply side and the turbine and the PVs and
the demand side, conscious that you’re using [. . .] I don’t think
it’s constantly looking at some sort of gizmo reminding you of
what to do, rather than having a general subconscious notion,
perhaps I’ve used too much hot water. It’s sort of lifestyle things
really, changing them slowly.
In this manner, microgeneration is a catalyst for reformulating
ractices—concerning consumption as well as production.
.7. Ownership and trust
Ownership is as a central feature of citizenship and plays an
mportant role in responses to smart grid technologies. In marked
ontrast to energy technologies like nuclear power, the materiality
f such technologies were treated by participants as being largely
enign. The issue lay in their institutional framework. There was a
erception that, through CDSM, ownership of energy could trans-4 ‘Smart’ appliances here refers to networked devices which in this case would
llow them to be started and stopped remotely by, for example, grid operators.
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 loss of autonomy over the ordering of domestic life. These con-
erns were typically realised in references such as ‘Big Brother’ and
Orwellian’.
This discourse was closely associated with distrust of
ndustry—and, to a much lesser degree, government—motives.
nterestingly, whilst the notion of being monitored by energy com-
anies provoked highly negative responses, Strengers’ research
ith Australian participants in a 2008 dynamic pricing trial found
hat notions of being monitored by the energy company were
ositive—participants reported themselves encouraged to adapt.
his discrepancy highlights the importance of local context to how
uch technologies are received. International work does suggest
hat the high levels of distrust in energy companies in the UK [44]
39] are becoming increasingly common elsewhere [45].
For the focus groups this distrust undermined the case for CDSM,
ot only in terms of home autonomy, but also throwing doubt on
laims for environmental and ﬁnancial beneﬁts of such schemes.
or example, whilst accepting of the logic that a more efﬁcient use
f energy sources would result in lower carbon emissions, partici-
ants noted that efﬁciencies also meant lower costs for the energy
ndustry, which it was assumed would not be passed on.
W: we have taken things on board over the years like recycling
which we have actually been told to do and we  now do [. . .]  but
I think it’s who tells us, I think it’s the companies that we don’t
trust. So it’s actually who gives out that information I think is
really important and whether people trust it, is it for their own
good rather than the company’s good? We  recycle because we
believe that it’s good for the planet but we feel they’re not, they
are doing it just to increase their share then it’s different.
The mediating inﬂuence of ownership was demonstrated by the
ifferent responses given by focus groups in communities with
nd without locally-owned power schemes. In communities with
isGenMiGrid-like ownership of local energy schemes, negative
iscourses around proﬁt-based industry motivations contrasted
ith positive discourses around the community reaping rewards.
W: It is to do with trust and the trust [in energy suppliers] is
gone. But that’s why one of the things that’s going on at the
moment in Weston is the [community power] thing because
there is the trust so people are willing to go along with it,
because the money is going back in to Weston. When it’s disap-
pearing into the ether, into directors’ pockets. . .
Furthermore the shared ownership of community schemes
ntroduced additional practices supportive of energy citizenship.
articipants in the Lowell community turbine scheme were in the
rocess of deciding how to spend a community fund generated by
he proﬁts from the scheme at the time of our focus groups. Another
ractice emerging from the scheme involved a group of members
ho had set up a monthly exchange of energy use data through
hich they could compare savings and learn from one another.
n these examples we see the strongest expression of energy citi-
enship, not only adopting a role as custodian of energy, but also
ntegrating energy into the social structures they inhabit. In this
ay, these new forms of practice resemble the ‘co-management of
ractice’ that Strengers calls for [10], though it is notable that it
s the ‘co-management of resources’ which appears to provide the
mpetus to this development.
. DiscussionIn this research we identiﬁed two forms of engagement with
nergy, forms that we characterised as personas. Participants often
witched between them depending on the context—few stuck
D
t
n
e Social Science 2 (2014) 21–29 27
olely to one throughout. Despite this plasticity, it was clear some
articipants found one easier to adopt than the other. The energy
onsumer was often the initial perspective and gave little thought to
nergy, and despite concerns that they weren’t using it as efﬁciently
s they could—whether in environmental or ﬁnancial terms—they
ere not seeking a greater level of engagement. The popularity
f IHDs that provided information in intuitive forms (e.g. colour
oding) was  understandable in this framework, proving a means
f doing something—namely demonstrating concern about energy
se—whilst not requiring anything. Such forms of participation
arres labels the ‘change of no change’ [46, p. 517].
The poverty of options available within an energy consumer
rame were captured by the following perspective:
C: I might charge my  phone at work instead of home, but you
can’t totally change your lifestyle because you’ve hit your limit
on your energy use.
The current energy system in its dominant form, of multi-
ational energy generation companies on the one hand, and
ndividual household users on the other, is markedly skewed
owards the creation of energy consumers. Given this context, it
s to be expected that focus group participants were quick to adopt
he persona of energy consumer. However, they were just as quick
o undermine it through discussions that revealed how such a fram-
ng was  incomplete in capturing their motivations. In this complex
etting modest ﬁnancial inducements are likely to struggle for trac-
ion. The alternative option open to the energy consumer frame is
o limit CDSM to schemes which do not threaten existing conve-
ience.
Within this frame there is a tendency to treat consumers’
choices’ as sacrosanct, which has the danger of unnecessarily
ssifying high-energy practices [16]. Furthermore, in approaching
he smart grid user as a consumer, CDSM risks becoming sim-
ly another means of targeting the sale of electronic devices
o the home, with the effect of increasing consumption rather
han reducing it [47]. Darby points out that some DSM—such as
utomation of fridge-freezers—requires little or no input from
he user [6], and so it would not be correct to suggest that all
mart grid technologies require conscious end-user engagement.
ven within an energy consumer frame, such technology could
e adopted. However, these passive options offer only a fraction
f the efﬁciency possibilities the smart grid offers, and given the
cale of carbon reduction targets such limited ambition could be
isastrous.
For many focus group participants, the energy consumer per-
ona itself was  unsustainable. Instead as discussions continued,
hey often adopted the more reﬂexive, engaged persona of energy
itizen. From a practice theory perspective, the energy citizen can
e said to emerge from participants’ knowledge, meanings, skills,
nd access to technology. Taking knowledge ﬁrstly: awareness of
he contradictions of government and industry tasking consumers
ith consuming less, prompted distrust of the dominant consumer
rame. Regarding meanings, discussion from wider perspectives
rompted accounts in which energy’s role was  more than simply
n unacknowledged resource. These perspectives could be spatial,
uch as in contrasts between wasteful Western lifestyles and those
ess wealthy elsewhere, or temporal, as in nostalgic reﬂections of
ow participants’ communities had united in response to disrup-
ions such as black outs (see also [48]). Energy was placed in a wider
ocial context in which responsibilities were considered alongside
ights. Perhaps most notably for smart grids, where supported by
isGenMiGrid systems, the citizen could demonstrate the skills
o enact their own self-guided supply-responsiveness, e.g., run-
ing appliances when the home’s solar panels were generating
lectricity.
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For those with experience of community and/or personal energy
chemes there was a greater salience of energy. Far from reject-
ng the idea of reconﬁguring practices to conserve energy, they
lready had experience of such changes. What microgeneration
chieves with energy we have labelled ‘alterity surfacing’, for the
anner in which it renders energy a functional element of house-
old planning. More than simple increased visibility, individual and
ommunity power generation shifts the public from a position of
utsider upon which the system imposes change. It was from this
osition one participant responded “Why  should I change my rou-
ine? Because Big Brother wants me  to? Go and take a ﬂying leap”
B]. Instead the public becomes a stakeholder: “When I see I’ve got
urplus, [. . .]  when I know I’m using 300 watts and I generated 4 kilo-
atts, I think ‘what can I do with that?”’[L]. Strenger’s [10] argument
o look beyond co-managing resources to co-managing practices
s a compelling one, and provides a fully realised vision of what
nergy citizenship might extend to. We note though that in our
ample the closest this came being realised was within community
nergy schemes, and these may  be thought of as ﬁrst steps in this
egard.
For the smart grid to achieve its full potential, it is clear that
he model of energy citizen holds out greater promise for change
han does that of the energy consumer. The question becomes
ow such a frame can be pursued. Such a question is too great to
o justice to here, but some points stand out immediately. Smart
etres have a clear utility for energy suppliers, and in a support-
ve socio-technical environment (e.g. combined with community-
r micro-generation), the display of this information by IHDs could
ncourage user engagement. However, deployed in isolation, in the
xpectation of increasing engagement, the rollout of smart metres
nd IHDs is likely to be a missed opportunity.
Our data has indicated the wealth of change brought about by
ommunity energy schemes and by microgeneration technologies
n particular. Here, the utility of such schemes should not merely
e calculated in terms of energy produced, but also energy citizens
roduced. Indeed, the popularity of community energy schemes
ontrasted starkly with the pervasive distrust of the major UK
nergy suppliers. Community level solutions are not immune to
onﬂict and distrust [49], and to succeed must be tailored to local
ircumstances [2, p. 831]. It is promising then that the UK gov-
rnment is now making greater efforts to support such schemes
hrough its Community Energy Strategy [50], though in taking no
teps to challenge the current energy consumer frame, and the
ominance of the big generators, it appears there is still some
ay to go before a local-scale implementation of DisGenMiGrids
s realised on any signiﬁcant scale.
. Conclusion
The challenge of realising the smart grid is at least as much insti-
utional as technical. At the core of this lie two conﬂicting visions
f the ‘demand side’ [5]. In one a largely passive consumer hands
imited control of some devices to the grid, with an IHD provid-
ng consumption and pricing feedback that is likely to go largely
nnoticed by the householder. Consumers here are a ‘managed’
emand side and the agent of change is limited to the technological
ealm, supported by some form of ﬁnancial inducement to encour-
ge adoption. The user of this smart grid remains essentially dumb.
his vision limits DSM opportunities to weak interventions requir-
ng little user engagement and subsequently fewer efﬁciencies.The contrasting vision is of an active citizen who  becomes
 ‘manager’ in the process of consumption as well as, poten-
ially, generation. Such a perspective avoids reifying current
ractices as sovereign consumer choices, and frames—and so Social Science 2 (2014) 21–29
o-constructs—users who  are involved in both problem and solu-
ion. Whilst tensions exist between the two visions, they are clearly
ot mutually exclusive, and in practice they are likely to co-exist.
e  note that the energy citizen is not a panacea for the challenge
f de-carbonising energy supplies, after all the active stance of a
itizen cannot simply be assumed to correspond with the goals
f other stakeholders, whether they be distant communities, gov-
rnment or industry. It appears a necessary step for ensuring user
ngagement however and a broad uptake of smart grid technolo-
ies. Ultimately, the most effective smart grid will be one in which
ntelligence is sourced from users as well as devices.
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ppendix A. Focus group demographics
Location Modal household
income
Gender Ethnicity Age
City £25,000–50,000 Female – 10
Male – 8
White–British
– 11
White–Other
– 2
Black and
Ethnic
Minority
(BEM) – 5
18–30 – 4
30–45 – 8
45–60 – 3
>60 – 3
Bickerton <£25,000 Female – 11
Male – 7
White–British
– 15
White–Other
– 1
BEM – 2
18–30 – 1
30–45 – 4
45–60 – 8
>60 – 5
Weston <£25,000 Female – 13
Male – 5
White–British
– 13
White–Other
– 2
BEM – 3
18–30 – 0
30–45 – 5
45–60 – 5
>60 – 8
Lowell >£75,000 Female – 8
Male – 10
White–British
– 16
White–Other
– 0
BEM–2
18–30 – 1
30–45 – 7
45–60 – 7
>60 – 3
Totals Female – 42
Male – 30
White–British
– 55
White–Other
– 5
BEM – 12
18–30 – 6
30–45 –
24
45–60 –
23
>60 – 19
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